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LEGISLATIVE REFORM
COMPROMISING THE CLEANUP OR
COMPROMISING TO CLEANUP? RCRA SUITS
ALLOWED UNDER CERCLA § 113
I. INTRODUCTION
The creation and disposal of hazardous waste are scientific and chemical con-
cepts beyond the complete comprehension of most of us. The effects on the environ-
ment and on our public health are concepts that are not. This article explores the effect
of current environmental legislation on a hazardous waste site when it is being cleaned
up. Usually, citizens in the community near the site rejoice once a site reaches the
cleanup stage; in most cases, this is the goal the citizens have sought for years. In
these cases, an interruption of this cleanup phase represents a waste of time and re-
sources and a threat to the public health by leaving the site unattended. In the past,
parties have brought suit to stop a cleanup because they are "potentially responsible
parties"' (PRP's) and they wish to undertake a less extensive and less expensive
cleanup. Congress reacted to these attempts and included a bar to such suits in certain
environmental statutes.
Recently, however, parties have brought suit not in the interest of less expensive
cleanup actions but, instead, in the name of more extensive actions to protect the pub-
lic health. In these actions, a party, such as a citizens' group or a state, claims that the
cleanup methods fail to comply with all necessary safety provisions under various
environmental statutes. Currently, the circuits are split on whether or not the latter
party, such as the citizens' group, can bring an action such as this one.
Congress took note of the need for regulation of hazardous waste and passed the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976.2 The purpose of RCRA
was to regulate hazardous waste in a "cradle to grave" manner? Thus, when a facility
produced hazardous waste, RCRA regulated its generation, transportation, storage,
and/or disposal through permit requirements. Congress amended RCRA in 1980 with
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) when it realized that RCRA did not address the clean-up of previously
contaminated sites. CERCLA provided for a "Superfund" which funded the clean-up of
these sites with capital obtained from the parties responsible for the contamination
1. Potentially responsible parties are those parties who have used the land in some way where
the problems are occurring and may be held liable for the costs of the cleanup under CERCLA. 42
U.S.C. § 9613 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994).
3. "Cradle to grave" describes the concept that RCRA will regulate waste from the time it is
created to the time it is disposed of. H.R. REP. No. 1016 (I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprint-
ed in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1994).
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CERCLA's overall purpose was to amend RCRA "to establish a program for appropri-
ate environmental response action to protect public health and the environment from
danger posed by such [inactive hazardous waste] sites.... [since] [e]xisting law is
clearly inadequate to deal with this massive problem."5
While maintaining this noble goal, CERCLA has left many unresolved issues due
to its ambiguous drafting.6 A remaining issue is whether a party can bring suit under
RCRA against a facility that is undergoing a CERCLA clean-up. The circuits are cur-
rently split on whether CERCLA § 113 bars a court from having jurisdiction to inter-
rupt a CERCLA cleanup.7 CERCLA § 113(h) states that
[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law.., to review any chal-
lenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 104 [42 USCS §
9604] ... in any action except one of the following: ... (4) An action under
section 310 [42 USCS § 9659] alleging that the removal or remedial action taken
under section 104 ... was in violation of this Act. Such an action may not be
brought with regard to a removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at
the site.'
Section 113 was aimed at PRP's who sued to stop a cleanup believed to be too expen-
sive or too broad.9 RCRA allows citizens to bring suit against a hazardous waste site
if it presents an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment.1
0
Although the statutory language appears clear, CERCLA and RCRA each contain
other provisions implying that these statutes were meant to work together, and not
against one another. RCRA states that "[tihe Administrator shall integrate all provi-
sions of this Act, with the appropriate provisions of ... and such other Acts of Con-
gress as grant regulatory authority to the Administrator."' CERCLA also states that
"[n]othing in this Act shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of
any person under other Federal or State law."' 2 Congress went so far as to add in the
General Rules section of CERCLA that the EPA is required to consider the goals of
statutes such as RCRA. By directly incorporating the goals of other environmental
statutes into CERCLA, Congress limited the power of § 113. The statutory language is
the key to finding a solution to the current circuit split.
The circuit split can best be explained with the following example. Antienviro,
Inc. has improperly dumped hazardous waste onto a site in Biostate, USA. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) properly undertakes a CERCLA study
and begins a remedial action, or removal, to clean up the site. The response, however,
includes the incineration of a toxic substance dumped by Antienviro in violation of
RCRA. Clarence Hatewaste, a citizen of Biostate, brings suit against the EPA for
violating RCRA. Antienviro and the EPA argue that Mr. Hatewaste cannot bring this
5. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6120.
6. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1994).
8. Id. (emphasis added).
9. H.R. REP. No. 253 (I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2941.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(1) (1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (1994).
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suit since it is a "challenge" to a cleanup. CERCLA precludes challenges to a cleanup
authorized by the EPA. The issue presented is twofold: do we allow the EPA and the
facility to violate RCRA, thereby putting the public health and our environment at risk
due to the unregulated hazardous waste emissions; or do we allow a party to bring suit
to interrupt a clean-up allowing the site to remain a hazard for months or years, obvi-
ously putting the surrounding community and environment at risk?
As both of these questions involve the public health and the protection of our
environment, it is easy to see how circuits could differ on the answers. Three circuits
agree that CERCLA § 113 does not preclude a RCRA action by a state. 3 The leading
case espousing this view is United States v. Colorado.4 The Tenth Circuit concluded
this since Colorado was not "challenging" the remedial action. 5 Instead, Colorado
merely proposed that the cleanup actions not violate RCRA, in the interest of the pub-
lic and environmental health. 6 The court reasoned that to find the opposite would go
against the intent of Congress and the basic goals of RCRA and CERCLA. 7
Five circuits disagree, however. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit decided not to
allow a citizens' group to interrupt a cleanup in McClellan Ecological Seepage Situa-
tion v. Perry.8 McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) is a citizens' group
which claimed that the McClellan Air Force Base was not complying with various
environmental laws including failing to complete RCRA's individual reporting and
permitting requirements. The court concluded that the language of CERCLA § 113(h)
makes the intent of Congress clear thereby precluding all challenges to a CERCLA
cleanup, not just those of PRP's.
The effects of the circuit split are numerous. First, if a citizen lives in a circuit
which reads CERCLA as precluding RCRA suits, she may get less protection because
of an inadequate cleanup than a citizen who lives in a circuit which would allow a
13. The Tenth Circuit is joined by the First Circuit in Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509
(lst Cir. 1991) (CERCLA did not deprive federal court of jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenge
to a lien); and by the Second Circuit in Browning-Ferris Industries of S. Jersey v. Muszynski, 899
F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1990) (Court can determine adequacy of EPA determination that stainless steel must
be used in wells).
14. 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
15. The Colorado court determined that to "impact the implementation of a response action is not
enough to constitute a challenge to the action." 990 F.2d 1575. See infra note 34 and accompanying
text.
16. Id. at 1575-77.
17. Id. at 1577-59.
18. 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit is joined by the Third Circuit in Boarhead
Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991) (Plaintiff not allowed to challenge the EPA's listing
of site on NPL under National Historic Preservation Act); the Fifth Circuit in Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989) (Chemical manufacturer's suit precluded because
it would delay cleanup under §113); the Seventh Circuit in Schalk v. Reilly, 990 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.
1990) (Court declined to allow jurisdiction over citizen challenge to construction of incinerator); North
Shore Gas Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 930 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1991) (Section 113(h)
precludes federal court jurisdiction over EPA requirement that polluter construct boat slip); the Eighth
Circuit in Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212
(8th Cir. 1993) (Court denied citizens suit alleging incineration part of cleanup harmful to public
health); and the Eleventh Circuit in Alabama v. Environmental Protection Agency, 871 F.2d 1548 (11th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1990) (District Court did not have jurisdiction to hear suit by
citizens about failure of notice about Texas toxic wastes moved to local toxic waste disposal site).
19. 47 F.3d at 328-329.
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RCRA suit to a cleanup. In the latter circuit, she can stop the cleanup and correct its
insufficient nature. The cleanup can then proceed in a more satisfactory way. Second,
since pollution is not subject to the same circuit boundaries that the courts are, a haz-
ardous waste facility in the Ninth Circuit may pollute a citizens' property located in
the Tenth Circuit. Since the Ninth Circuit precludes these suits, the party in the Tenth
Circuit is subject to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, which may compromise her
health. Third, the split requires that the EPA and facility undergoing the cleanup be
prepared to have their remedial action interrupted in some circuits but not others.
While this is unfair to those facilities located in circuits following the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation, it also places an undue burden on the EPA to take circuit boundaries
into account when planning a remedial action.
Finally, the circuit split will cause additional litigation. Parties will bring suits in
the hope of the circuit reversing its stance on this issue or carving out an exception.
By amending the statute, Congress can avoid these effects and clarify CERCLA. If
amended, CERCLA has the potential to improve the quality of our public health and
our environment.
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari to cases with the potential to resolve
the split.2" Thus, Congress has the responsibility to resolve the split. Congress should
not merely follow one side of the split. Instead, Congress should revise CERCLA §
113 to represent a compromise between the circuits. Section 113 should protect the
public health and the environment by allowing cleanups to proceed efficiently and
rapidly. Section 113 should also allow interruption of those cleanups that cause more
harm than the delay.
II. A QUESTION OF INTERRUPTION
A. United States v. Colorado: Basin F Must Comply with CERCLA & RCRA
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Colorado,2 asserted that a federal court
does have jurisdiction to hear certain claims under RCRA relating to an EPA-autho-
rized cleanup of "Basin F." Basin F is a hazardous waste treatment, storage, and dis-
posal facility near Denver, located within the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. The EPA listed
it on the National Priority List (NPL).22 Basin F served as a storage place for millions
of gallons of liquid hazardous waste23 and is noted as one of the most contaminated
areas in the nation."
Colorado sued against the Arsenal for violations of its state EPA-authorized
RCRA statute,25 the Colorado Hazardous Waste Management Act (CHWMA). 26 Un-
20. Alabama v. Environmental Protection Agency, 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 991 (1990); and Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981
(1990).
21. 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
22. CERCLA requires the President to develop this NPL identifying those sites with
releases or threatened releases which need government response actions. See 42 U.S.C. §
9605(a)(8) and 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1992). A site must be listed on the NPL as a pre-
requisite to a Superfund-financed remedial action at the site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B)
and 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1992).
23. 990 F.2d at 1566.
24. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir. 1992).
25. The EPA can authorize a state to carry out its own hazardous waste manage-
ment act in lieu of RCRA. The EPA has this authority pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9626(b)
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der CHWMA, the Arsenal was required to file part A and B of its permit application
to the Colorado Department of Health (CDH).27 Part B included the closure plan for
Basin F, the basis for the litigation. CDH found the Arsenal's closure plan to be inade-
quate and developed its own." The Arsenal refused to implement this alternative plan
and Colorado sued in November, 1986. Around the same time, the Arsenal, with Shell
Oil Co.29 and the EPA, announced a CERCLA interim response action and agreed on
an action in June, 1987.
Two years later, CDH issued a final compliance order to force the Arsenal to
comply with CHWMA. The final compliance order required the Arsenal to submit a
closure plan for Basin F, "including plans and schedules addressing soil contamination,
monitoring and mitigation, [and] groundwater contamination."" The United States
then brought this suit to enjoin Colorado and CDH from taking action to enforce the
final compliance order. Based upon the clear language of the statute, the District Court
found that CERCLA § 113 barred Colorado's RCRA enforcement action. 3' The Tenth
Circuit disagreed, however, citing the overall objective of CERCLA as the basis for its
disagreement. The court stated that the objective was to impress RCRA responsibilities
onto a cleanup site regardless of the commencement of a CERCLA cleanup. The court
stated "we must also look to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and
policy."32 The court also asserted that "Congress clearly expressed its intent that
CERCLA should work in conjunction with other federal and state hazardous waste
laws in order to solve this country's hazardous waste cleanup problem.,
33
The court combined this statutory language reading with an interpretation of a
"challenge" to a CERCLA cleanup. 34 The court stated that "an action by a state to
enforce its hazardous waste laws at a site undergoing a CERCLA response action is
not necessarily a challenge to the CERCLA action. 35 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
a "challenge" would attempt to halt the Arsenal's and the EPA's response action.
Instead, Colorado's motion merely urges compliance with RCRA during the course of
their chosen response action.3' The Tenth Circuit disagrees with the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of challenge as an order that would merely "impact the implementation
(1994). In these cases, RCRA's regulations serve as a floor for the regulations, not a
ceiling. Therefore, the state's hazardous waste statute must at least meet RCRA's stan-
dards, but may create higher state requirements.
26. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-15-301 to 25-15-316 (1989 and Supp. 1992).
27. RCRA required that the Arsenal apply for a permit in two parts. The first, part A, required
general information about the facility, operator, waste and processes for treatment, storage and disposal.
See 40 C.F.R. § 270.13 (1992). The second, part B, required more specific information concerning the
storage of the material, including a storage closure plan. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.14 (1992).
28. The Arsenal probably knew that the CDH would not accept its closure plan since this was
the same deficient plan that the EPA rejected years before under RCRA. 990 F.2d at 1571.
29. Shell leased part of the Arsenal from 1946 to 1982, disposing of hazardous waste in Basin F.
990 F.2d at 1572.
30. Id. at 1573.
31. Colorado v. United States Dept. of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562 (D. Co. 1989).
32. 990 F.2d at 1575 (citing Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)).
33. id. at 1575.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1576.
36. Id.
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of a CERCLA response."37 Thus, Colorado was not attempting a challenge and was
given the right to require the CERCLA cleanup to comply with RCRA.
Many commentators agree with the Tenth's Circuit's interpretation of § 113.
First, the Tenth Circuit's reading conforms to Congress's overall hazardous waste
scheme.38 Congress enacted CERCLA as an Amendment to RCRA, intending
CERCLA to compliment RCRA, not exclude it.39 Second, Congress's plan with
RCRA, CERCLA and all other environmental statutes is to protect the public health.
By using only those sections found in CERCLA, the threats that Congress enacted
RCRA to prevent may be forgotten in an ambitious but inadequate CERCLA cleanup.
Finally, commentators from the state of Colorado4' praise the Colorado decision for
its aggressive response to Basin F, a site that has plagued the environmental health of
Colorado for decades." These commentators, in particular, understand that hazardous
waste elicits emotion and that a state must be able to take part in the remedial action
to provide a voice for its citizens. This is especially true when that state has accepted
the EPA-authorized responsibility through a state RCRA statute, such as CHWMA.
Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit and these commentators neglect to address cer-
tain key issues upon which the Ninth Circuit and its supporters rely. These issues
include the threat of unlimited litigation and the risk of interruptions delaying remedial
action for years. Thus, while the Tenth Circuit's decision has strength, in order to
adequately resolve the fault in the statutory language, Congress must draft a new pro-
vision.
B. MESS & Arkansas Peace Center: CERCLA Stands Alone
MESS v. Perry best demonstrates the reasoning that CERCLA bars a federal
court's jurisdiction.42
Similar to U.S. v. Colorado, MESS deals with a federal military base whose
disposal of hazardous waste has led it to a massive cleanup. The McClellan Air Force
Base served as an aircraft depot and maintenance center for the Army and Air Force
since the 1930's.43 Its deposition of hazardous waste into uncontained earthened pits
on the Base led to severe leaching into the groundwater beneath the Base." Pursuant
to CERCLA and an Interagency Agreement between the Air Force, the EPA, and the
state of California, McClellan implemented its key component of the cleanup plan: its
groundwater extraction system. This extraction system "allows contaminants to leach
from the inactive waste pits into the groundwater which is then mechanically extracted
and treated. This process was intended to remove all contaminants and prevent migra-
37. Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990).
38. Nathan H. Steams, Comment: Cleaning up the Mess, or Messing up the Cleanup: Does
CERCLA's Jurisdictional Bar (Section 113(h)) Prohibit Citizen Suits Brought Under RCRA?" 22 B.C.
ENV. AFF. L. REV. 49 (Fall, 1994).
39. Id. at 54.
40. See Shane Justin Harvey, Environmental Law Survey, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 961 (1994); Alana
Bissonnette, Clean Up Your Federal Mess in My State: Colorado Has a State RCRA-Voice at the
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 257 (1993).
41. In 1956, the Arsenal constructed Basin F to store and dispose of contaminated liquid waste.
See Colorado v. United States Dept. of the Army, 707 F. Supp 1562 (D. Co. 1989).
42. 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995).
43. Id. at 327.
44. Id.
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tion of contaminated groundwater from the Base."45 Among other allegations, MESS
claimed that this treatment violated RCRA. The court found that this action was a
"challenge" under § 113 since it sought to improve on the actual cleanup.' The court
stated that "[a]ny delay or interruption of the process will slow the cleanup action, a
result that Congress sought to avoid in enacting § 113(h)."47 Therefore, since
Congress's intent not to interrupt a cleanup was clear under CERCLA and the court
was unable to "fashion any remedy that would not interfere with McClellan's
CERCLA groundwater extraction system," MESS could not dispute the CERCLA
cleanup of McClellan.' The court continued on its interpretation of CERCLA §
113(h) and allowed MESS's claims against the active waste storage sites, just not those
passive sites undergoing a CERCLA cleanup.
Commentators supporting this interpretation recognize the importance to protect
the public health but find that an interruption and subsequent delay of a cleanup will
only leave an untreated site, harming the public more than the cleanup. This may
not always be true, however, since it is possible for the removal of a substance to be
more risky to the public health than leaving the substance where it is.50 This proposi-
tion has support, however, since the facility, the EPA, and the state, complete with
experts on hazardous waste and each party's competing interests, have managed to
agree on a remedial action for a site. Therefore, chances are high that at least one
party has considered and incorporated an idea on which a citizens' group would bring
suit.
This interpretation, however, does not adequately deal with several issues ad-
dressed by the Tenth Circuit's interpretation. First, the danger to the surrounding envi-
ronment and the public health of surrounding communities is high if a CERCLA clean-
up is inadequate and devastating if the court's allowing a review of the cleanup could
have shown this. Also, precluding a citizen's suit until after a cleanup renders a
citizen's right to bring suit moot since after the cleanup, the objection to the cleanup
will have no bearing.
On the other hand, the circuits agree on certain key points which Congress must
consider in amending § 113. Both sides understand the importance of the intent of
Congress and the language Congress used to create § 113. Also, both believe that
incorporation of RCRA requirements into a cleanup action are important. Finally, both
sides admit that the state's involvement is important, especially when a state has an
EPA-authorized RCRA statute.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 330.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Jason H. Eaton, Creating Confusion: The Tenth Circuit's Rocky Mountain Arsenal Deci-
sion, 144 MIL. L. REV. 126 (Spring 1994); Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Hazardous Waste
Laws and Its Effect on Tort Law and Practice, C427 ALI-ABA 929 (1989).
50. Asbestos is one example since it is safe as long as it remains in a solid piece. During re-
moval, breakage or crumbling can occur, which makes sealing the asbestos safer than removing it.
Robert P. Kearney, U.S. Orders a Phaseout of Asbestos Production, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 7, 1989.
See also Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1990) (citizens allege that incineration part of cleanup is more
harmful to the public health).
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III. THE NECESSARY STATUTORY REVISION
In an attempt to resolve the circuit split, Congress should amend CERCLA § 113
to read as follows:
(4)... Such an action may not be brought with regard to a removal where a
remedial action is to be undertaken at the site or is currently in process by a
potentially responsible party. Such an action may be brought under any statute
by a party not considered a potentially responsible party only in one of the fol-
lowing:
(a) When the party can present evidence that the remedial measures present
an imminent danger to human life or the environment;
(b) At the end of an intermediate stage in the remedial action.5
By amending § 113 in this way, Congress will accomplish three necessary ends.
First, § 113 will differentiate between parties who have the right to judicial review and
potentially responsible parties whose primary goal is to find a less extensive and ex-
pensive cleanup procedure. Second, § 113 will allow review to those parties who can
prove that the cleanup procedures will cause danger. By limiting it to those with proof,
the court is assured that the interruption has merit and that the EPA's scientists may
have not adequately considered other options. Finally, § 113 will allow review at stag-
es of the cleanup so that CERCLA does not deprive parties of their right to judicial
review but also reassures that the cleanup is not halted in the middle of a procedure.
Therefore, Congress will successfully resolve the current circuit split and protect public
health at the same time.
Kristen M. Fletcher*
51. Original text found at 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1994).
* B.A., Political Science and Spanish, Auburn University, 1993; J.D. Candidate, Notre
Dame Law School, 1996.
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